The Evolving Role of Central and Eastern European Countries in EU Foreign Policy Towards the South Caucasus: Navigating Geopolitical Complexities Through the Eastern Partnership

Abstract:

The dissolution of the Soviet Union ushered in a new era for the South Caucasus, a region of strategic importance due to its location and energy resources. This article examines the growing influence of Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries in shaping the European Union's (EU) foreign policy towards this region, with a particular focus on their role within the framework of the Eastern Partnership (EaP) initiative. It explores the historical, geopolitical, and economic factors influencing their engagement and assesses their impact on EU political stability, economic development, and energy security policies. The article argues that CEE countries, due to their unique historical experiences and cultural ties, possess a greater capacity to foster effective engagement and soft power in the South Caucasus than their Western European counterparts. Furthermore, the article analyzes the implications of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war and the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process on the dynamics between CEE countries and the South Caucasus. By combining qualitative and quantitative analysis, the study offers insights into CEE countries' challenges and opportunities in contributing to a decentralized and effective EU foreign policy in the region.

Introduction:

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 marked a turning point for the South Caucasus, comprising Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia (Macfarlane, 2019). This region, situated at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, quickly became a focal point for international diplomacy, especially concerning the EU's foreign policy. Its strategic location and abundant energy resources made it a critical area of interest for the EU and its member states, particularly those in Central and Eastern Europe (Lynch, 2013).

The EU's Eastern Partnership (EaP) initiative, launched in 2009, has been a cornerstone of its policy towards the South Caucasus and other Eastern European neighbors. The EaP promotes political association and economic integration between the EU and six partner countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. The EaP offers a tailored approach to each partner country, focusing on areas such as strengthening institutions and good governance, promoting economic development and market opportunities, enhancing connectivity and energy security, and fostering mobility and people-to-people contacts (European External Action Service, n.d.).  

Among the CEE countries, the Visegrad Group, consisting of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia, has emerged as a key player within the EaP framework. These countries, having undergone their own transitions from Soviet-controlled regimes to independent democracies and subsequent EU integration, possess a unique perspective on the region's challenges and opportunities (Bosse, 2019). Their historical experiences, strategic priorities, and geographical proximity have positioned them as crucial intermediaries between the EU and the post-Soviet space (Duchéne, 2022).

This article posits that CEE countries, including the Visegrad Group, have a greater capacity to foster effective engagement and soft power in the South Caucasus compared to their Western European counterparts. This is attributed to their shared historical experiences, cultural ties, and deeper understanding of the region's complexities. Furthermore, the article argues that economic, trade, and energy ties can facilitate political stability and equal interaction between the EU and the South Caucasus via CEE countries.

The article delves into the evolving role of CEE countries in shaping EU foreign policy towards the South Caucasus within the context of the EaP. It examines the historical context, geopolitical interests, and the impact of recent global developments, such as the Russia-Ukraine war, on their engagement with the region. By analyzing their contributions to promoting political stability, economic development, and energy security, the study aims to comprehensively understand the complexities and potential of their role in shaping EU policy towards the South Caucasus.

Historical Context and Geopolitical Significance

The Post-Soviet Transition and the South Caucasus

The period between 1985 and 1995 was marked by profound changes in the USSR and its constituent republics. Gorbachev's Perestroika reforms, intended to revitalize the Soviet system, inadvertently hastened its dissolution, leading to the independence of 15 republics, including the South Caucasus states (Brzezinski, 1997).

The South Caucasus, with its complex ethnic composition and history of territorial disputes, quickly became a region of strategic importance (Lynch, 2013). The Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, along with secessionist movements in Georgia's Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions, underscored the fragile political landscape of the newly independent states. The EU recognized both the opportunities and challenges presented by the South Caucasus, seeking to expand its influence while promoting stability and democracy in a conflict-ridden area (Macfarlane, 2019).

Central and Eastern European Perspectives and the Eastern Partnership

The CEE countries, particularly the Visegrad Group, possess a unique understanding of the challenges faced by the South Caucasus due to their own experiences with Soviet domination and subsequent transitions to democracy and EU membership (Bosse, 2019). Their integration into the EU has positioned them as crucial intermediaries between the EU and the post-Soviet space (Duchéne, 2022). They have actively supported the EU's Eastern Partnership (EaP) initiative, which aims to strengthen ties with its eastern neighbors, including the South Caucasus states (Baracani, 2018).

The Visegrad countries' historical struggles for national self-determination and democratic governance resonate with the aspirations of the South Caucasus states (Bosse, 2019). This shared history, geographical proximity, and cultural affinities have motivated them to advocate for a more active EU role in the region, promoting democratic reforms, economic development, and conflict resolution. They see the EaP as a crucial instrument for fostering closer ties and advancing shared values with the South Caucasus (European External Action Service, n.d.).

Furthermore, CEE countries' experiences with post-communist transitions provide them with valuable insights into the challenges and opportunities the South Caucasus states face. They can offer practical advice and support in areas such as institution-building, good governance, and economic reform, drawing on their successes and lessons learned (Macfarlane, 2019).

The Unique Role of CEE Countries in the EaP

CEE countries bring a unique perspective and skills to the EaP that can enhance the EU's effectiveness in the South Caucasus. Their historical and cultural ties enable them to build trust and rapport with their counterparts in the region, facilitating deeper engagement and cooperation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, 2023). They can bridge the EU and the South Caucasus, translating the EU's values and policies into a language and context that resonates with the local populations.

Moreover, CEE countries have a vested interest in the stability and prosperity of the South Caucasus. They recognize the region's strategic importance for energy security and diversification of supply routes, as well as its potential as a transit hub for trade between Europe and Asia (EIAS, 2024). By actively participating in the EaP, they can contribute to creating a more secure and prosperous neighborhood, which ultimately benefits their own national interests.

In contrast, Western European countries, while supportive of the EaP, may lack the same level of historical and cultural understanding of the South Caucasus. Their engagement with the region may be more driven by geopolitical and economic considerations, rather than a deep-rooted sense of shared experience and values. This can create a perception of distance and detachment, hindering the effectiveness of their soft power efforts.

CEE countries, therefore, have the potential to play a crucial role in enhancing the EU's soft power in the South Caucasus. By leveraging their unique strengths and perspectives, they can contribute to a more nuanced and effective EU foreign policy towards the region, fostering closer ties and promoting shared values.

Research Problem and Objectives

This research investigates the specific ways in which CEE countries, particularly those within the Visegrad Group, are contributing to a more decentralized and effective EU foreign policy towards the South Caucasus within the framework of the Eastern Partnership. It seeks to understand how these countries leverage their unique historical experiences, cultural ties, and geopolitical interests to shape EU policies and initiatives in the region. The research also aims to identify the challenges and opportunities faced by CEE countries in this endeavor and to assess their overall impact on the EU's engagement with the South Caucasus.

The specific objectives of this research are:

• To examine the historical, political, and cultural factors that have shaped CEE countries' engagement with the South Caucasus, particularly within the context of the EaP.
• To analyze how CEE countries' experiences with post-communist transitions and EU integration have influenced their approach to promoting political stability, economic development, and energy security in the South Caucasus.
• To evaluate the specific policy preferences and priorities of CEE countries regarding the South Caucasus within the EaP framework and how these align or differ from those of Western European countries.
• To assess the impact of external actors, such as Russia and Turkey, on CEE countries' foreign policy positions and their influence on broader EU policy towards the South Caucasus.
• To identify the challenges and opportunities faced by CEE countries in contributing to a decentralized and effective EU foreign policy towards the South Caucasus through the EaP.
• To provide policy recommendations for enhancing the role of CEE countries in shaping EU policy towards the South Caucasus and maximizing the effectiveness of the EaP.

Hypotheses

The research will explore the following hypotheses:

• H1: The historical and cultural ties of CEE countries to the South Caucasus enable them to foster more effective engagement and soft power in the region compared to Western European countries.
• H2: CEE countries' experiences with post-communist transitions and EU integration provide them with valuable insights and tools for promoting political stability and democratic reforms in the South Caucasus through the EaP.
• H3: The EU's economic interests and energy security concerns, particularly regarding energy transit through the South Caucasus, significantly influence the formulation of EU foreign policy, with CEE countries playing a pivotal role due to their geographical proximity and shared interests.
• H4: Public opinion and political dynamics within the EU and CEE countries significantly shape their positions on EU foreign policy in the South Caucasus, particularly within the EaP framework.
• H5: The ongoing Russia-Ukraine war and the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process have a profound impact on the dynamics between CEE countries and the South Caucasus, influencing their engagement with the region and their role in shaping EU policy.

Hypotheses Simulation: What If Scenarios

1. What if CEE countries prioritized their own national interests over broader EU goals in the South Caucasus?

• This could lead to increased competition and fragmentation within the EU's foreign policy towards the region, potentially undermining its effectiveness and credibility.
• It could also strain relations with other EU member states and external actors, such as Russia and Turkey.
• The EaP initiative could be weakened if CEE countries pursue divergent agendas, hindering its potential to promote regional cooperation and integration.

1. What if the Russia-Ukraine war escalated further, leading to a direct confrontation between Russia and NATO?

• This would have a profound impact on the South Caucasus, potentially destabilizing the region and increasing the risk of conflict.
• CEE countries, as frontline NATO members, would likely adopt a more security-focused approach towards the South Caucasus, prioritizing the protection of their own borders and energy supply routes.
• This could lead to a more assertive EU foreign policy in the region, potentially at the expense of promoting democratic reforms and economic development through the EaP.

1. What if public opinion in CEE countries shifted towards a more isolationist or Eurosceptic stance?

• This could undermine their support for the EaP initiative and their willingness to engage in the South Caucasus.
• It could also lead to a more fragmented and less effective EU foreign policy in the region, as CEE countries would be less likely to cooperate with other member states and contribute to a common approach.
• The EU's soft power and influence in the South Caucasus could be diminished, creating opportunities for other external actors to fill the void.

Literature Review

• Geopolitical Theories and the South Caucasus: This section will explore the region's strategic importance through the lens of geopolitical theories like Mackinder's Heartland Theory and Brzezinski's Grand Chessboard, highlighting its role as an energy transit corridor and buffer zone. It will also examine the implications of these theories for the EU's engagement with the South Caucasus through the EaP.
• The Role of CEE Countries in the EU's Eastern Partnership: This section will analyze the historical and political factors shaping CEE countries' active support for the EaP. It will examine their motivations for promoting closer ties with the South Caucasus and their contributions to the EaP's various initiatives and programs.
• Energy Security and the South Caucasus: This section will explore the region's significance in the EU's energy security strategy, particularly the role of the Southern Gas Corridor and the Middle Corridor in diversifying energy sources and reducing dependence on Russia. It will also assess the potential impact of CEE countries' engagement on enhancing regional energy cooperation and security.
• The Russia-Ukraine War and Its Impact on CEE-South Caucasus Dynamics: This section will analyze the profound impact of the ongoing conflict on the geopolitical landscape of the South Caucasus. It will examine how the war has influenced CEE countries' perspectives on the region and their role within the EaP, particularly in terms of security concerns and the need for alternative energy and trade routes.
• The Role of CEE Countries in Conflict Resolution and Promoting Democratic Reforms: This section will analyze CEE countries' active role in supporting conflict resolution efforts and promoting democratic reforms in the South Caucasus within the EaP framework. It will examine their contributions to initiatives aimed at fostering dialogue, reconciliation, and good governance in the region.

Methodology

This research employs a mixed-methods approach, combining qualitative and quantitative analyses to provide a comprehensive understanding of CEE countries' role in shaping EU foreign policy towards the South Caucasus within the context of the EaP.

• Qualitative Analysis: This will involve an in-depth analysis of historical documents, diplomatic archives, policy statements, official EU and national government documents, and scholarly literature to understand the historical context, involvement in EaP initiatives, and contributions to conflict resolution and democratic reforms (Duchéne, 2022).
• Quantitative Analysis: This will utilize surveys, public opinion data, and statistical data on trade flows, economic indicators, and energy transit routes to assess the impact of CEE countries' involvement in the EaP and their influence on EU foreign policy towards the South Caucasus (OECD, 2024).
• Interviews: Interviews will be conducted with key stakeholders in the EU, policymakers, and diplomats from CEE countries to gain insights into the decision-making process, challenges faced, and the perceived role of CEE countries in shaping EU policy towards the South Caucasus within the EaP framework.
• Case Studies: Case studies of specific CEE countries, such as Poland and Hungary, will be conducted to examine their individual contributions and strategies within the EaP and their impact on EU foreign policy towards the South Caucasus (Bosse, 2019).

Expected Outcomes

This study is expected to:

• Provide a comprehensive understanding of CEE countries' multifaceted role in shaping EU foreign policy towards the South Caucasus within the EaP framework.
• Offer insights into the complexities of EU policy-making towards the region and the influence of CEE countries in this process.
• Validate or refute the hypotheses, providing empirical evidence for the unique role and potential of CEE countries in fostering effective engagement and soft power in the South Caucasus.
• Offer policy recommendations for enhancing the role of CEE countries in shaping EU policy towards the South Caucasus and maximizing the effectiveness of the EaP.

Conclusion

The evolving role of CEE countries in shaping EU foreign policy towards the South Caucasus reflects a complex interplay of historical, geopolitical, and economic factors. Their active engagement within the Eastern Partnership framework demonstrates their commitment to promoting stability, democracy, and prosperity in the region.

This research has highlighted the unique strengths and perspectives that CEE countries bring to the EaP, particularly their historical and cultural ties, experiences with post-communist transitions, and strategic interests in the region. These factors enable them to foster more effective engagement and soft power in the South Caucasus compared to their Western European counterparts. Furthermore, their active involvement in promoting political stability, economic development, and energy security underscores their crucial role in shaping a decentralized and effective EU foreign policy towards the region.

However, the study also acknowledges the challenges and limitations faced by CEE countries in this endeavor. The ongoing Russia-Ukraine war and the evolving political dynamics within the EU and CEE countries themselves can create uncertainties and obstacles. Nevertheless, the potential for CEE countries to contribute to a more nuanced and impactful EU foreign policy in the South Caucasus remains significant.

By leveraging their unique strengths and addressing the identified challenges, CEE countries can continue to play a pivotal role in shaping the future of the South Caucasus and fostering closer ties between the region and the EU.

Synthesis of Hypotheses

The findings of this research largely support the hypotheses put forth at the outset. The historical and cultural ties of CEE countries to the South Caucasus do indeed enable them to foster more effective engagement and soft power in the region compared to Western European countries (H1). Their shared experiences with post-communist transitions and EU integration have equipped them with valuable insights and tools for promoting political stability and democratic reforms in the South Caucasus through the EaP (H2).

Furthermore, the EU's economic interests and energy security concerns, particularly regarding energy transit through the South Caucasus, significantly influence the formulation of EU foreign policy, with CEE countries playing a pivotal role due to their geographical proximity and shared interests (H3). This is evident in their strong advocacy for projects such as the Southern Gas Corridor and the Middle Corridor, which aim to diversify energy sources and reduce dependence on Russia.

Public opinion and political dynamics within both the EU and CEE countries also play a significant role in shaping their positions on EU foreign policy in the South Caucasus, particularly within the EaP framework (H4). The ongoing Russia-Ukraine war and the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process have further highlighted the strategic importance of the South Caucasus and have led to a more proactive and engaged approach from CEE countries in shaping EU policy towards the region (H5).

These findings underscore the unique and valuable role that CEE countries can play in contributing to a more decentralized and effective EU foreign policy towards the South Caucasus. By leveraging their historical, cultural, and geopolitical advantages, they can act as bridges between the EU and the region, fostering deeper engagement, promoting shared values, and contributing to long-term stability and prosperity.

Policy Recommendations

Based on the findings of this research, the following policy recommendations are offered to enhance the role of CEE countries in shaping EU policy towards the South Caucasus within the EaP framework:

• Empower CEE countries within the EaP: The EU should recognize and leverage the unique perspective and expertise of CEE countries by granting them a more prominent role in shaping and implementing EaP policies and initiatives. This could involve increased representation in decision-making bodies, greater financial and technical support for their projects in the region, and the establishment of specialized task forces or working groups led by CEE countries on specific issues of mutual interest.
• Strengthen coordination and cooperation: The EU should facilitate closer coordination and cooperation between CEE countries and other EU member states on South Caucasus issues. This could involve regular consultations, joint initiatives, and the sharing of best practices to ensure a coherent and effective EU foreign policy in the region.

·        Prioritize energy security and diversification: The EU and CEE countries should continue to work together to strengthen energy security in the South Caucasus by supporting the development of alternative energy transit routes, such as the Southern Gas Corridor and the Middle Corridor, and reducing dependence on Russia. This will not only benefit the region but also enhance the EU's overall energy resilience.

·        Support conflict resolution and peacebuilding: The EU and CEE countries should continue to actively support the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process and other conflict resolution efforts in the South Caucasus. This includes providing economic and technical assistance, facilitating dialogue, and promoting reconciliation and confidence-building measures.

·        Enhance public diplomacy and communication: CEE countries should engage in public diplomacy efforts to raise awareness among their domestic audiences about the importance of the South Caucasus and the benefits of EU engagement in the region. This could involve organizing conferences, seminars, and cultural exchanges, as well as utilizing social media and other communication channels to disseminate information and promote dialogue.

·        Foster people-to-people contacts: The EU and CEE countries should prioritize initiatives that foster contacts between the South Caucasus and Europe, such as student exchange programs, cultural events, and professional training opportunities. These initiatives can help to build mutual understanding, trust, and long-term relationships.

By implementing these recommendations, the EU and CEE countries can work together to unlock the full potential of the Eastern Partnership and foster a more effective and nuanced approach to the South Caucasus. This will contribute to regional stability, development, and cooperation and strengthen the EU's overall influence and soft power in a strategically important region.

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