Directions for the development of US-Azerbaijani relations after the Second Karabakh War

In the South Caucasus region, at the intersection of strategic interests, tensions are escalating, drawing the attention of global powers. US-Azerbaijani relations are becoming the focal point amidst geopolitical transformations. Rich in historical interactions and contemporary challenges, these relations garner attention within the context of three key directions.

The first revolves around American interest in the events of the Second Karabakh War, where shifts in US policy from the Trump to the Biden administration had varying impacts on regional stability. The second direction is linked to geopolitical competition, wherein American efforts are directed towards engaging in peace negotiations to prevent military conflicts, displacing Russia as a mediator, and weakening the influence of other players. Finally, energy cooperation with Azerbaijan and the expansion of the Southern Corridor emerge as strategic avenues to ensure energy security not only for the South Caucasus but also for Europe.

This article analyzes the dynamics of interaction between the US and Azerbaijan in light of these three key directions, exploring how these relations are formed and influencing the current geopolitical landscape.

US Interests in the Context of the Second Karabakh War

The armed conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh that erupted following the summer escalation in 2020 drew the attention of numerous external actors, including Russia, Turkey, Iran, the UK, and France, as well as organizations like the OSCE Minsk Group and the European Union. However, a crucial aspect in this geopolitical web comprises the United States of America, whose interests and response to the events unfolding in the region warrant specific attention.

The United States reaction to the war in Nagorno-Karabakh was ambiguous and demonstrated a certain vacillation of interests at the onset of the conflict. President Donald Trump, during the period of the pre-election campaign, appeared indifferent to the military events. This can be attributed to several factors, including domestic politics and the initial presidential debates. Consequently, initially, Washington emerged as one of the last prominent global actors to show interest in the South Caucasus region. This indicates a situational weakening of American interest in this conflict at the outset of its escalation [1].

Simultaneously, the beginning of the Trump administration saw the rise to power in Armenia of Prime Minister N. Pashinyan, who proposed radical reforms and emphasized strengthening the country’s foreign policy independence. From the American perspective, this could create «excellent prospects for a more stable democracy» and enable Armenia to become an area of particular interest for the United States. A significant direction in American policy became the development of Armenia’s economy, which was intended to be the driving force towards strengthening relations between the two countries [2].

Furthermore, it is essential to note that the American policy towards Armenia did not hinder the United States from maintaining friendly relations with the Azerbaijani government. US Deputy Secretary of State Stephen Biegun signed an agreement with the Azerbaijani authorities in March 2020 sparked dissatisfaction in Armenia. According to this agreement, the US planned to continue providing military aid to Azerbaijan in exchange for Baku’s commitment to diplomatically resolve disputed issues with Armenia. In this regard, the meeting on October 8 in Geneva with the OSCE Minsk Group, where Azerbaijan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jeyhun Bayramov, among others, met with US diplomats, is also noteworthy. The American delegation did not comment on the information provided about Armenia’s illegal policies and its involvement with mercenaries [1][3].

During Donald Trump’s presidency, the US interest in the Second Karabakh War was relatively limited. It wasn’t until October 23, 2020, after numerous clashes and an escalation of the conflict, that Trump announced his participation in negotiations between Baku and Yerevan. Several days later, the Foreign Ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan, Zohrab Mnatsakanyan and Jeyhun Bayramov, met with US Deputy Secretary of State Stephen Biegun and reaffirmed their commitment to observing the agreement on a humanitarian ceasefire. This event marked a rare display of interest from the American leader in the conflict, which had previously remained almost on the periphery of his foreign policy [4].

US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo met with the foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan in Washington; however, these meetings were not accompanied by substantial statements. On October 24, during a meeting with the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi, the discussions revolved around the necessity of restoring the humanitarian ceasefire and preventing the intervention of other states. On the one hand, this indicated the neutral stance of the US towards the conflict; on the other hand, it showcased a reluctance to allow the strengthening of the geopolitical position of its adversaries [5][6].

However, with the new administration’s arrival under Joe Biden’s leadership, the US interest in events in the South Caucasus significantly increased. Biden took a course towards supporting Armenia by acknowledging the mass killing of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire in the early 20th century as Genocide. This decision became a significant step in strengthening relations between the US and Armenia but sparked dissatisfaction from Turkey, a NATO member. Consequently, Washington began actively participating in the conflict and demonstrating its position, even at the expense of violating traditional allied relations with Turkey [7].

With the Biden administration, Washington continues its policy in the post-Soviet direction, aiming to strengthen its leading role on the global stage. This interest in the South Caucasus region is based on its strategic position and significance for US national interests. Specifically, Washington focuses on seeking new markets for American liquefied natural gas and exploring the region’s infrastructure opportunities. Therefore, the US interest in the South Caucasus is expected to grow.

However, during the Second Karabakh War, the US appeared more passive and practically helpless in resolving the conflict. Their strategic decision to support an American-led project aimed at conflict resolution was conditioned by the situation’s complexity and the desire to shift the burden onto Russia. Nevertheless, this does not affect the US’s intentions to implement this project in the future. In the context of the Armenian lobby in the US Congress and initiatives to recognize Nagorno-Karabakh and exclude Turkey from NATO, the US may use the ‘Armenian issue’ as a means to influence Turkey, especially considering its ambitions in the region [8].

Security issues in the South Caucasus

The geopolitical struggle in the South Caucasus has profoundly impacted US-Azerbaijani relations after the Second Karabakh War. The war and subsequent ceasefire brokered by Russia dealt a severe blow to the initiatives of Europe and the US in resolving the conflict within the OSCE Minsk Group format. While the West expressed readiness to contribute, different players required more trust to address the complex security issues in the region.

A significant catalyst for peace talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan was the war in Ukraine, highlighting the necessity of resolving armed conflicts. The EU and, more recently, the US have stepped into a mediator role in the bilateral process, which has brought tangible progress. However, concerns persist regarding Russia’s actions as it maintains its regional interests [9].

Considering these shifts in the regional power balance between Russia and Turkey and the influence of regional powers and external actors, the space for maneuvering by external players has significantly expanded. There’s an awareness of a change in the regional order, where Turkey could strengthen its position and challenge Russian dominance. Turkey is a crucial ally of Azerbaijan and sees itself as a leader in the Turkic world. However, Turkey encounters resistance from its NATO ally, the US, in its geopolitical plans. Nevertheless, Azerbaijan could be a bridging element in relations between these states [10].

Azerbaijan possesses significant economic and military resources in this geopolitical struggle. It also holds strategic importance for transatlantic energy security and maintains close relations with Israel while bordering Russia and Iran. This region becomes a focal point in the plans of the US and EU to bolster their influence and ensure security.

An affirmation of this strategic importance was signing the ‘Memorandum of Understanding on Strategic Partnership in the Energy Sector’ between Azerbaijan and the EU in 2022. This memorandum aims to strengthen energy security and increase the export volume of Azerbaijani gas, which holds significant importance for the US and EU [11].

The history of US-Azerbaijani relations in the South Caucasus began to take shape during the administration of William Clinton, who formulated a new global foreign strategy known as the ‘Clinton Doctrine.’ This doctrine included support for the independent countries of the South Caucasus and Central Asia and the aim to reduce the US’ energy dependency on the Persian Gulf region. Thus, the increased interest of the US in the region is driven by its geostrategic, geopolitical, and geoeconomic potential [12].

Biden’s program and the American strategy in the Caspian region involve several vital points. Firstly, the United States intends to enhance its attention and presence in the Caspian Sea region, including the countries around the Caspian Basin (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan) and the South Caucasus countries (Georgia, Armenia). This signifies that the Caspian region is once again a priority for American foreign policy, and the US aims to reinstate it among the strategic areas within its multi-vector policy.

The United States intends to play a crucial role as a critical arbiter and mediator capable of balancing relations between the smaller Caspian and South Caucasus states (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Georgia, Armenia) and influential powers such as Russia, China, and the European Union. Consequently, the US plans to strengthen its personnel capacity in American regional embassies and increase funding for strategic programs to defend democracy and sovereignty. Hence, the United States aims to actively engage in the ongoing processes in the region and influence its trajectory [13].

A crucial element of the US strategy in the Caspian involves containing the ‘great powers,’ namely Russia and China, and ensuring a balance of power in the region. This is important not only for controlling trade routes and key transportation corridors but also for expanding the influence of American corporations in the energy and resource sectors. The US commitment to supporting democracy, sovereignty, and the territorial integrity of the region’s states is a pivotal element of their strategy.

The Caspian region remains under US scrutiny regarding Chinese investments and economic influence. The American administration is concerned that China may strengthen its presence and investments in energy projects in the region in the coming decades. China’s ambition to establish stringent economic relationships and fund projects may jeopardize the independence of the Caspian Basin countries, impeding their ability to determine their national economic and resource policies. Therefore, the US plans to pressure the region’s countries, encouraging direct American and European investments.

To achieve these goals, the American strategy in the Caspian involves active diplomatic interactions between American embassies in the region. They are expected to influence the decision-making processes between states, including resource allocation and the development of common strategies [14].

Social, political, and religious threats are also at the forefront of US attention in the region. The American strategy in the Caspian aims to counter the risk of extremism and terrorism that may arise from social and political tensions. Such threats are considered not only within the context of the Caspian region but also in conjunction with similar risks in Central Asia, where the potential for terrorist activity also persists.

However, it’s worth noting that not all initiatives and proposals related to regional policies in the Caspian region receive unanimous support from all actors, including neighboring countries and international partners. For instance, the initiative to create a ‘3+3’ format for negotiations on the situation in the Caucasus was met with disapproval from the US. The Secretary of Defense, Lloyd Austin, emphasized the necessity to respect the terms of the 2008 ceasefire agreement in Georgia before discussing new international platforms [15].

Thus, the United States actively seeks to strengthen its influence in the Caspian region, where it sees crucial geopolitical and economic interests. The new strategy involves diplomatic and economic instruments and a commitment to promote conflict resolution and ensure stability in the region.

Energy cooperation and the expansion of the Southern Corridor

Energy cooperation between the United States and Azerbaijan after the Second Karabakh War became crucial to their relationship. During a meeting with the Chargé d’Affaires of the United States in Azerbaijan, Hugo Guevara, and the Minister of Energy, Parviz Shahbazov, the prospects for cooperation in the energy sector were discussed. Special attention was given to the successful American-Azerbaijani forum on green energy, emphasizing Azerbaijan’s important role in ensuring Europe’s energy security [16].

President Joe Biden appreciated the close partnership between the countries over the past 30 years. In his address to participants at the Baku Energy Week, he emphasized that establishing the ‘Middle Corridor’ and creating the Southern Gas Corridor contribute to the diversification of energy sources, contributing to global energy security. The President highly praised Azerbaijan’s efforts in the green energy field and reaffirmed the United States’s readiness to continue supporting long-term peace and stability in the South Caucasus [17].

Laura Lochman, Advisor to the Deputy Secretary of State for Energy Diplomacy in the United States, met with Energy Minister Parviz Shahbazov to discuss the expansion of the Southern Gas Corridor and joint cooperation in green energy. The importance of these issues is emphasized not only on paper but also in real actions aimed at strengthening the energy security and sustainability of the region [18].

The meeting between Azerbaijan’s Minister of Energy, Parviz Shahbazov, and the US Ambassador Lee Litzenberger highlighted discussions on the export of green energy, the prospects for hydrogen production, and cooperation with international companies. Litzenberger emphasized Azerbaijan’s reliability as an energy supplier [19].

The concluding focus in the discussion of energy cooperation between the US and Azerbaijan was the ‘Green Energy’ forum organized by the Ministry of Energy and AZPROMO. Deputy Minister of Energy Elnur Soltanov emphasized energy source diversification and the importance of establishing manufacturing capacities for ‘green energy.’ American companies expressed their interest in renewable energy in Azerbaijan, and the administration highlighted its readiness to support the country in achieving its goals in this field [20].

Following the completion of the TAP (Trans Adriatic Pipeline) project at the end of 2020, the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) became a crucial element in ensuring energy security in the region. The TAP project stretched through Greece, Albania, and the Adriatic Sea and reached Italy, providing a capacity of 16 billion cubic meters of gas. This was made possible through the participation of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey, Greece, Bulgaria, Albania, and Italy in the overall ‘Southern Gas Corridor’ project spanning 3500 kilometers. The critical gas source for the pipeline system was the Caspian field ‘Shah Deniz.’ Completing the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline allowed Azerbaijan to supply its gas to Europe, specifically Greece and Italy [21].

The SGC, proposed in 2008, became a strategic route to reduce Europe’s dependence on Russian gas. This corridor includes the South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP) and its expansion (SCPX), the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP), and the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP). Amidst the 2022 energy crisis, gas deliveries to Europe via the SGC increased by over 40%, reaching 11.4 billion cubic meters, exceeding the nominal capacity of the TAP pipeline by 10 billion cubic meters. With its massive Shah Deniz field, Azerbaijan became the primary gas supplier for the SGC [22].

However, Azerbaijan’s increasing gas needs for domestic consumption raise questions about the ability to meet both growing exports and internal demand. An agreement with Russia for gas supply was signed in 2022 but was not renewed in 2023 after concerns from the EU about increased gas exports from Russia to Azerbaijan.

Recent events indicate a closer relationship between Azerbaijan and the Balkan countries, particularly in light of the energy crisis in the Balkans. The Russian-Ukrainian war and sanctions from Western countries have led to problems in energy resource supplies from Russia, making the Balkans particularly vulnerable. Exploring energy cooperation possibilities, Azerbaijan signed a memorandum of understanding with Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia. This move aims to increase exports of Azerbaijani energy resources to these countries and create additional supply routes [23].

President Ilham Aliyev emphasized Azerbaijan’s plans to double gas exports by 2027, expressing confidence in achieving this goal due to sufficient resources. The country seeks to strengthen its role as a regional gas supplier, and introducing new deposits this year should further solidify its position. Azerbaijan is actively developing partnerships with regional allies, including Romania and Serbia, to ensure energy security and strengthen its position as a reliable gas supplier to Europe [24].

The Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) plays a significant strategic role in U.S. energy diplomacy, giving a new direction to foreign policy and bolstering national security. Senator Richard Lugar, Chairman of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, recognized energy diplomacy as critical in addressing national security challenges. This has led to political and structural changes in the U.S. diplomatic sphere, where energy security has become a central component of foreign policy.

Within efforts to unite allies and friends in the Caspian region, Senator Lugar led a mission to Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Turkmenistan in 2012 to assess the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) status and the associated U.S. diplomatic efforts. The strategic interests of the United States in uniting Caspian countries with European and global markets have been recognized on a bipartisan basis. The development of the SGC, starting from the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline and the South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP) for natural gas, became a vital element of the U.S. strategy [25].

The second stage of the SGC includes the expansion of the SCP, new pipelines through Turkey, and routes into Europe. This stage strengthens the role of the SGC as a primary channel for alternative gas supplies, ensuring supply diversification on commercially viable terms. The role of the SGC has become critical, especially in the Ukrainian crisis and unstable relations with Russia.

Senator Lugar and his colleagues highlight the strategic value of the SGC in ensuring Europe’s energy independence. The Ukrainian crisis revealed Europe’s vulnerability due to its dependence on Russian gas, making the SGC a key element in supply diversification. The second phase of the SGC will link continental European markets with Caspian gas, minimizing dependence on transit through Russia. This will provide market access for Trans-Caspian tankers carrying Kazakh oil and consolidate strategic advantages.

The Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center, which housed researchers actively involved in establishing the SGC, emphasizes the importance of this corridor. Researchers, including Ambassador Richard Morningstar and Matt Bryza, played a crucial role in supporting the SGC, expressing conviction in its strategic significance for the U.S. and their allies [26] [27].

In conclusion, the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) represents an essential element of energy diplomacy between the U.S. and Azerbaijan after the Second Karabakh War. Evolving from the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and the South Caucasus Pipeline to its second stage, the SGC ensures supply diversification and reduces Europe’s dependence on Russian gas. This corridor becomes a key to ensuring energy independence and an instrument for strengthening U.S. diplomatic ties with allies and partners in the Caspian region and Europe.

After analyzing the dynamic spectrum of Azerbaijani-American relations following the conclusion of the Second Karabakh War, it is clear that these countries are on a path of convergence in various areas of cooperation.

In the context of the first aspect concerning U.S. interests in the Second Karabakh War, it becomes apparent that Washington’s reaction to the initial military events during the conflict was unclear, reflecting a vacuum of interests during the pre-election period. However, U.S. interest in the region significantly increased with the Biden administration coming into office. President Biden’s active involvement in supporting Armenia and recognizing the Armenian genocide in the Ottoman Empire underlined a shift in the U.S. position in the region.

The second key aspect related to security in the South Caucasus gains additional significance in the context of changes in the regional balance of power. The war in Ukraine underscored the importance of resolving armed conflicts, becoming a crucial catalyst for peaceful negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The role of the United States and Turkey as mediators and their influence on the bilateral negotiations demonstrates a commitment to ensuring stability and preventing further military confrontations by weakening the Russian Federation as a regional geopolitical player.

The third aspect considered in this article is energy cooperation and the expansion of the Southern Corridor. Projects such as the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) and the South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP) have become catalysts for strengthening ties between countries and providing strategic value to the United States in promoting diversification in energy resource supplies.

In conclusion, Azerbaijani-American relations strive for new horizons in this era of change. Cooperation in the humanitarian sphere, the development of energy projects, and active involvement in post-conflict resolution indicate a deep partnership and mutual commitment to achieving stability and prosperity. Step by step, the United States and Azerbaijan are establishing a model of mutually beneficial cooperation that has the potential to become a significant factor not only in the region but also on the global stage.

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